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Tariff Rate Quotas in The EU
Jean-Christophe Bureau and Stefan Tangermann
The European Union has opened tariff rate quotas (TRQs) after the Uruguay Ronnd (UR),
following the agreement that minimum access should be provided and current access not be
restricted. The EU TRQs are described and their origin is explained. Descriptive statistics are
provided in order to assess the implementation of the market access provisions of the 1994
UR Agreement. Transparency of the EU TRQ system and fill rates of TRQs are examined.
Overall, the EU’S record in the area of TRQs is relatively satisfactory, compared with those of
other countries. Concerns remain, however, as to the exact articulation of the (regional)
Europe Agreement and some quotas under minimum access,
The 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agricul-
ture (URAA) resulted in an obligation to improve
market access in agriculture for World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) member countries, beyond the
hoped-for effects of the scheduled reduction in tar-
iffs. All countries were expected to allow access to
their domestic markets for imports equivalent to at
least 3% of domestic consumption in the 1986-
1988 base period. This proportion was to rise to
5% at the end of the implementation period (i.e. in
year 2001 in the European Union). These provi-
sions are referred to as “minimum access.” In ad-
dition, the URAA agreed that preexisting market
access had to be preserved. That is, access condi-
tions for historically established import quantities
would be maintained (a provision referred to as
“current access”).
In the beginning of the implementation period
(i.e. 1995), EU bound tariffs were too high for the
EU to meet minimum access commitments without
specific instruments. The scheduled 36% decrease
in tariffs is unlikely to be sufficient for the EU to
meet the commitments at the end of the implemen-
tation period. Final tariffs and special safeguard
provisions will still provide significant protection
to EU farmers in some sectors. Hence, for a num-
ber of products the EU opened up tariff rate quotas
(TRQs) in order to meet the obligations of current
access. When traditional imports did not represent
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a sufficient percentage of domestic consumption,
TRQs were applied so as to meet URAA minimum
access commitments.
Several recent studies have suggested that TRQs
resulted in little market access improvement in
most of the 34 countries with TRQs in the official
schedule that summarizes their WTO commit-
ments as far as market access is concerned (USDA
1997; Pobury and Roberts 1999; OECD 1999). In
most countries, TRQs have mainly been used to
maintain traditional import flows but have not led




URAA commitments were based on the Mo-
dalities established by the WTO which were
not incorporated as part of the UR final Agree-
ment (see IATRC 1994). What countries ac-
tually agreed to was what they respectively
submitted in their schedules, whether or not it
reflected the application of the Modalities. As
a result, the Modalities discipline was not al-
ways followed, and in practice, the measures
implemented are not always in line with the
spirit of the UR Agreement. For example,
some countries calculated their TRQs in a way
that was not consistent with the Modalities.
The resulting TRQs do not always correspond
to 370 of consumption. This also made it pos-
sible to minimize market access increases for
most sensitive commodities.
TRQs were often set for products character-
ized by tariff peaks, so that out-of-quota tariffs
remain prohibitive. This de facto results in a
larger number of quantitative restrictions to
imports than before the Uruguay Round, even
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Table 1. Number of Tariff Quotas by Product Categories
Meat
Grains
Oilseeds Sugar Dairy Poultry Other Eggs Others Total
EU 15 4 12 6 22 3 25 87
Canada 5 — 11 2 1 2 0 21
USA 3 6 24 — 1 — 20 54
W’ro 339 50 183 249 21 528 1370
Source: from WTO and OJEC figures.
though the Agreement’s purpose was to con-
vert quantitative restrictions into tariffs
through the so-called tariffication process.
l Commitments as well as management of
TRQs lack transparency in many countries,
This creates grey areas which allow some
countries to get around some of the URAA
disciplines. Of particular importance is the
latitude given to (or taken by) countries to use
different—and sometimes inconsistent—
statistical classifications or to define products
at a level of very fine detail restricting access
to quotas for particular products from specific
origins.
l TRQs under minimum access are not always
allocated on a Most Favored Nation (MFN)
basis as was specified in the Modalities,
Countries have used existing freedom to fill
not only current access but also sometimes
minimum access TRQs with imports under
preferential agreements. In such cases, only
one or a very few countries are allowed access
to the TRQ concerned and can take advantage
of the new trade opportunities. Where this is
the case, it considerably limits the scope of the
current functioning of URAA in terms of trade
liberalization. In some cases, quotas are allo-
cated to countries which are unlikely to be
able to export the relevant commodity. In
other cases, tariffs under preferential agree-
ments are lower than the in-quota MFN tariffs
so that minimum access quotas are de facto
filled with preferential imports from particular
countries,
l Even though countries have to open their mar-
kets to imports at particular tariffs within the
TRQs specified in their schedules, they are not
required to import quantities corresponding to
the TRQs. Because of the manner in which
TRQs are administered only a small share of
the TRQ quantities is sometimes actually im-
ported. This translates to a low fill rate for
many quotas.
In the following sections we assess the imple-
mentation of the URAA in the EU in comparison
with other developed countries. We first describe
briefly TRQs in the EU, We then refer to a list of
criteria in order to assess how the EU has imple-
mented URAA commitments as far as TRQs are
concerned relative to those in other OECD coun-
tries. We focus on the calculations of TRQs; on the
tariffs for the commodities under TRQs; on the
transparency of the system and notification proce-
dure; on the allocation of import licences to spe-
cific countries; on the administration of TRQs; and
on the observed fill rates.
A Brief Description of EU TRQs
Tariff Rate Quotas in the European Union
The European Union established 85 TRQs in its
schedule resulting from the Uruguay Round. An
extra quota for grape juice and grape must (follow-
ing negotiations under Article XXIV.6 of the
GATT in the context of EU Northern enlargement)
was added in September 1996. A quota for rum and
taftia was added in July 1997, following the 1996
Singapore ministerial meeting agreement of the
WTO, As a result, a total of 87 tariff rate quotas
were incorporated in the commitments of the fif-
teen members in the EU, after Austria, Finland and
Sweden had joined the Union. The precise descrip-
tion of these quotas can be found in the Official
Journal of the European Communities (OJEC,
1999), ] Table 1 shows the different categories of
products covered by TRQs. It is, however, impor-
tant to stress that the economic importance of the
imports covered varies widely, For example, in
some cases TRQ volumes are as little as 129 tons
1Note that in the official schedule, two quotas for com and sorghum
are officially part of Oresame tariff rate quota, which explains the widely
quoted figure of 86 TRQs in the EU. See OJEC (1999) for derails, The
recent tariff quota allocated to the U.S. for malting barley (100,000 tons
for years 1999 and 2000) is not part of the 87 TRQs listed above. Rather,
it represents part of an agreement with the EU under WTO dispute
settlement procedures after the US. challenged the reference price sys-
tem for grains that deprived U.S. exporters of duty reductions on high-
value grains agreed upon during the Urnguay Round.72 April 2000 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
of poultry, while other TRQs deal with 2 million
tons of maize, 34,000 tons of tenderloins, or 2,2
million tons of bananas. Clearly, the number of
TRQs per se, or average figures computed across
TRQs, has little meaning.
Origin of the TRQs
In the EU, most MFN tariffs were determined un-
der the process of tariffication, That is, former
measures such as variable levies were converted
into tariffs. The tariffication process resulted in
high base tariffs. TRQs were set either to preserve
market access by ensuring that historical quantities
continued to be treated under former access con-
ditions, or to provide opportunities for additional
imports so as to fill minimum market access obli-
gations in spite of the high, sometimes prohibitive,
MFN tariffs.
In the EU schedule, the TRQs have a clear ori-
gin. Forty-four quotas, representing a total of 155
tariff lines in the United Nations’ harmonized sys-
tem (HS) classification at the 8-digit level, were
presented in the schedule under current access, A
total of 37 tariff quotas representing roughly 160
tariff lines at the 8-digit level were presented under
minimum access. Quotas for non-tarified products
include 6 quotas corresponding to 7 tariff lines at
the 8-digit level, for fresh potatoes, carrots, turnips,
sweet peppers, and almonds, They are also listed
separately.
While current access quotas often apply to live
animals, beef, fruits and vegetables, minimum ac-
cess TRQs were mainly opened for meat, dairy
products and grains. In general, the quotas under
current access apply to larger import quantities
than those under minimum access. For example,
while current access quotas correspond to imports
of roughly 430,000 tons of meat (not counting
large imports of live animals), minimum access
quotas for meat amount to a total of only 130,000
tons.
Some of the 87 TRQs originated from compen-
sating third countries for access they used to have
to the markets of Austria, Finland, and Sweden
before these countries joined the EU. This is the
1992 GATT oilseeds panel dispute was settled by
the opening of 20,000 tons of beef, 15,500 tons of
poultry meat, 500,000 tons of maize, and 300,000
tons of wheat, listed as TRQs under minimum ac-
cess. Older agreements resulted in import quotas
listed as TRQs under current access. This is the
case in compensations granted to traditional ex-
porters such as the United States (U.S.), for the
accession of Spain to the single market (TRQ of 2
million tons of maize and 300,000 tons of sor-
ghum).
Other TRQs resulted from bilateral arrange-
ments that the EU had in the past concluded with
individual exporting countries. This is the case for
most TRQs listed under “current access.” The rea-
sons for these bilateral arrangements differ. Ar-
rangements such as imports of high quality beef
have led to allocate a TRQ of 37,800 tons to par-
ticular countries including the United States,
Canada, Argentina, Australia, and New-Zealand.
In some cases, past voluntary export restraint
agreements were the historical source of TRQs
now included in the EU’s schedule. The export
restraint agreement between the EU and Thailand,
relating to Thailand’s manioc exports to the EU, is
one such case. The respective TRQ now requires
the EU to charge no more than the tariff that ex-
isted under that prior bilateral agreement, on the
quantity of imports set in that export restraint
agreement. It should be noted that the EU did not
open up any TRQs for products that had undergone
tariffication and where no specific bilateral ar-
rangements had existed in the past. This fact is
noteworthy, as one could well have argued that the
high EU tariffs that resulted from tariffication had,
at least in some cases, the potential of obstructing
imports that used to be shipped to the EU under
variable levies before the Uruguay Round. Thus, to
be on the safe side, some exporters could well have
requested the EU to setup current access TRQs for
tariffied products even in cases where no specific
bilateral arrangements had existed in the past.
However, the EU did not open up such TRQs,
arguing that tariffs resulting from tariffication pro-
vided at least as favorable access to the EU market
as respective non tariff measures had in the past.
case, for example, for TRQs on rice (70,000 tons),
oats (10,000 tons), and poultry meat (700 tons),
Transparency of the EU TRQs
These are listed under minimum access in the EU
schedule.2 Other TRQs resulted from the bilateral
Statistical classifications and definitions of prod-
settlement of earlier disputes. For example, the
ucts may strongly affect the practical scope of mar-
ket access commitments under the URAA, For ex-
ample, many countries have used very specific or
2In the WTO negotiations on compensation for EU enlargement,
even inconsistent statistical classifications of prod-
some other TRQs were also opened up, and tariffs were reduced on a ucts under TRQs, which make monitoring of the
number nf products, see IATRC 1997. implementation of market access cumbersome.Bureau and Tangennann Tarl~ Rate Quotas in the EU 73
Some countries have opened quotas using such
precise definition of the products covered that they
de facto restrict export rights to a particular coun-
try. Furthermore, changes inthe classification and
product definition during the implementation pe-
riod of the URAA have made it possible to shift
some sensitive commodities to a more protected
tariff line, Transparency is therefore an important
criterion in assessing URAA implementation.
The EU is one of the few countries that lists
separately its minimum access quotas. This is par-
ticularly important because current access quotas
are mainly a new shell for old preferential agree-
ments. Because current access quotas are seldom
open on an MFN basis, minimum access quotas
may be considered the only ones that might lead to
a genuine increase in market access. A separate
listing of minimum access quotas, such as provided
by the EU, makes it easier to assess the real impact
of the URAA. The list of tariff rate quotas, the
levels of imports, and the related tariffs are pub-
lished in the Official Journal of the EU (OJEC) in
a consistent classification, even though it imper-
fectly matches the classification used in the Sched-
ules,3
The Modalities specified that market access
commitments should be based on the 4-digit level
of the HS classification. Very few countries have
followed this guideline. In practice, TRQs were
notified at the 8-digit level (in Europe, Canada, and
the USA) and even at the 9 or 10-digit levels in
some other countries. This narrows the range of
products eligible, and therefore may restrict im-
ports to a particular list of countries. In the EU,
there are a few cases where the degree of detail in
the definition of products raises questions (for ex-
ample, a current access TRQ for live animal agreed
upon with the country of origin, Switzerland,
specifies the particular breed of the animal, infor-
mation normally well-beyond the 8-digit level of
the classification), However, it is noteworthy that
while the definitions are sometimes very restrictive
for current access quotas (which, anyway may be
allocated to a particular country that has agreed to
the specification chosen), this is not the case for
minimum access quotas in the EU, For that reason,
the statistical definition of the products can hardly
3One of the explanations of the discrepancies in description and codes
is that the OJEC refers to the new EU- 15 commitments, while the origi-
nal Schedule referred to EU- 12. Second, there have been changes in the
codes of the Nomenclature Combh5e (the European version of the HS
classification) used in the OJEC, but the EU continues to notify its WTO
commitments in the former classification, so that actual policy can he
compared to tbe original commitments. In addition, both codes imper-
fectly matchthe Geneva List of tarifflines used in the Schedule on bound
(out-of-quota) tariffs.
be seen as imposing hidden restrictions on imports,
as is the case in some other countries (e.g., Korea,
Japan, Brazil, and Thailand which have set quotas
on the basis of the 9 or 10 digit-level of the HS).
The transparency of the notifications to the
WTO has been questioned since the volume of
imports that is notified by the EU corresponded to
the volume specified in the licenses given to im-
porters. The Committee for Agriculture of the
WTO, has questioned the possible overestimation
of quantities imported by the EU, should licenses
not turn into actual imports. The EU claims that
this is not the case, since a deposit is required from
the importer. According to the EU, this makes it
unlikely that a trading company would acquire a
license and then choose not to import the product.
TRQ Calculation
According to the Modalities, WTO countries had
to offer a minimum access in 1995 equivalent to
3% of the average consumption between 1986 and
1988. However, some degree of freedom could be
used in the exact calculation of the tariff quota for
a particular commodity. Since the Modalities lost
their legally binding value when the Schedules
were adopted, the procedures used by some coun-
tries made it possible to limit the impact of the
minimum access commitments.
Consumption statistics do not match the detail of
trade statistics. Several countries chose to calculate
the level of quotas as a percentage of consumption
on aggregate commodities, and then to allocate this
quota among the more detailed commodities, so as
to set lower TRQ levels for the most sensitive
products. Typically, the United States and Canada
have used this procedure for dairy products. This
“dirty quotification” may have resulted in a level
of quotas below the actual 370 of consumption (see
Doyle 1999, for the case of dairy products in the
United States), The EU used a similar procedure
for meat products. It calculated the overall quota at
a rather aggregated level for the meat sector, and
then allocated the quota across the various tariff
lines in a somewhat arbitrary way. The allocation
between the different categories of meat may not
be the same as if the Modalities had been followed
precisely (IATRC 1994), However, because of the
rather large imports of bovines and beef under cur-
rent access quotas and the increase in minimum
access TRQs for pork during the implementation
period, the overall EU TRQs for meat seem con-
sistent with the 570 minimum access objective.
This is also the case for other TRQs than meat. For
wheat, for example, it is noteworthy that the EU
implemented a TRQ corresponding to 570 of do-74 April 2000 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
mestic consumption in 1995 (the requirement was
3% at that time).
Most Significant Increases in EU Market Access
Current access quotas, as well as those minimum
access TRQs which correspond to compensation
for EU enlargement, hardly correspond to new
trade opportunities. Taking this into account, the
examination of the EU TRQs suggests that the
quotas have only led to a limited increase in access
to the EU market. This is not specific to the EU: it
is also the case for most WTO countries. The main
impact of the URAA market access provisions are
on those commodities for which large minimum
access quotas have been set. In the EU, this is the
case for corn, for durum and quality wheat (note,
however that it resulted from the oilseed dispute
settlement with the U.S. rather than from the
URAA). It is also the case for cheese and skim
milk powder, where most of the increases in EU
market access are likely to occur. Large quotas
were also opened in the pork and egg sectors, but
these sectors experience little domestic support,
and domestic production is likely to compete with
imports.
In-Quota and Out-of-Quota Tariffs
The Setting of the Tariff
In principle, a TRQ should provide access to im-
ports thanks to a low in-quota tariff. It should
therefore be less restrictive than a regular quota
since exporting countries do not face a quantity
constraint, but simply a higher out-of-quota tariff.
In practice, however, out-of-quota tariffs often ef-
fectively exclude imports in excess of the quota in
many countries. There are also cases where the
in-quota tariff itself was set at a relatively high
level, maktng it difficult even for in-quota imports
to compete with domestic production (Podbury and
Roberts 1999).
The Modalities set even less precise constraints
on the level of tariffs for in-quota imports under
minimum access requirements. The Modalities
stated that tariffs should be “low or minimum,”
which left a lot of room for interpretation. In gen-
eral, most WTO member countries have set in-
quota tariffs as a percentage of the out-of-quota
tariff. However, the percentage varies a lot across
commodities and is often larger for the most sen-
sitive commodities.
In the EU, the MFN (out-of-quotas) tariffs are
expressed as a specific tariff (in Euros/ton, per hl
or per piece) or as an ad valorem tariff, or are
sometimes a combination of both types of tariffs.
Tariffs under current access TRQs are much lower
than the respective out-of-quota tariffs. For ex-
ample, the in-quota tariffs for live animals are de-
signed so that the specific component of the out-
of-quota tariff (which is by far the largest duty) is
set to zero. As a result, imports under current ac-
cess TRQs for meat products are subject to small
tariffs (from zero for sheep meat to 20% for beef).
Feedstuffs under current access TRQs also have
very small tariffs (from zero to 7’%0)and refined
sugar from African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP)
countries enters with no duty into the EU. Butter
from New Zealand still faces a significant tariff,
although roughly half that of the out-of-quota tar-
iff. On average, over the 50 quotas under current
access and for non-tarified products, the in-quota
tariff shows a reduction of 8070 compared to the
out-of quota tariff in the beginning of the imple-
mentation period (source: calculation by the au-
thors on the basis of ad valorem equivalent tariffs).
Since in-quota tariffs have remained unchanged
during the implementation period, while out-of
quota tariffs are scheduled to decrease, the gap is
narrowing.
Overall, in 2001, current access tariff quotas will
be roughly one third of out-of-quota tariffs for the
commodities concerned. There is, however, some
variation between commodities.
For TRQs under minimum access, the EU has
applied a rather uniform reduction relative to the
out-of-quota MFN tariff when setting in-quota tar-
iffs. With the exception of quality beef, where no
in-quota tariff is set but where it is specified that
the rate has to be fixed by competent authorities so
as to ensure that the quota will be filled, most of
the in-quota tariffs have been set at 32% of the
out-of quota MFN initial (base) tariff. The gap is
much larger for high-quality meat, since meat is
highly protected in the EU while it is subject to
in-quota low tariffs. Other exceptions include
milled rice, durum and wheat which are subject to
a zero in-quota tariff. In the case of minimum ac-
cess TRQs, the in-quota tariffs are also not sched-
uled to change during the implementation period of
the URAA. Hence for these products, too, the gap
is narrowing over time, and in-quota tariffs are
close to 40% of the out-of-quota tariff at the end of
the implementation period.
Compared with most other countries, where in-
quota tariffs were set in a more arbitrary way, the
EU procedure for minimum access TRQs is trans-
parent, and shows that the “strategic” setting of
tariffs across commodities so as to protect the most
sensitive commodities has been very limited, ThisTariff Rate Quo~as in the EU 75 Bureau and Tangennann
Table 2. In quota tariff, butter
In-quota tariff In-quota tariff
Currency/t Us$lton
Canada Cdn $163/t Us. $111/t
United States Us. $123/t Us. $123/t
European Union Euro 948/t Us. $loo4/t
Source: WTO schedules, Doyle 1999.
is similar to the reduction rates chosen for tariffs
that resulted from tariffication, where the EU has
opted for a 36~o reduction for nearly all products,
and not less than 2070 reduction in any single case.
However, the procedure maintains the tariff disper-
sion that can be observed for out-of-quota tariffs.
In particular, commodities for which the out-of-
quota tariff is high still experience a significant
in-quota tariff. The case of butter is typical in this
regard. The in-quota tariff under minimum access
is equivalent to Euro 948 per ton, which is much
higher than the in-quota tariff in other countries
(see table 2). Note, however, that this does not
seem to be a prohibitive tariff, since the minimum
access TRQ for butter has a fill rate close to 100Y0.
Allocation of Import Licenses
Allocation of Quotas to Specfic Countries
In principle, quotas under minimum access should
be allocated on a MFN basis, as specified in the
Modalities. In practice, however, some countries
display a lack of transparency concerning which
quotas are under minimum and current access, The
United States and Canada, for example, do not dis-
tinguish minimum access and current access and
do not notify in-quota tariffs. It is therefore diffi-
cult to assess whether or not they have granted
preferential in-quota tariffs to specific countries. In
other cases, the setting of in-quota tariffs at a level
higher than regular tariffs under preferential agree-
ments results in a de facto allocation of quota to a
preferentially treated (often neighboring) country.
This also often takes place with little transparency,
As far as trade liberalization is concerned, it
makes a lot of difference whether a particular
quota is open on a MFN basis, or whether access to
this quota is restricted to, say, one particular coun-
try, In practice, country-specific allocation is used
either to prevent access or to achieve reciprocal
benefits on a bilateral basis. In addition, the pos-
sibility to allocate quotas to a particular country
may result in low imports under this quota. Indeed,
quotas are sometimes allocated to countries that
are unlikely to be able to export a particular com-
modity (see Doyle 1999, for the case of the U.S.
TRQ for ice cream allocated to Jamaica). Admin-
istrative procedures often make reallocation of
such unfilled quotas to other would-be exporters
difficult, Preferential allocation of TRQs to par-
ticular countries is therefore an important issue for
assessing the implementation of URAA market ac-
cess provisions.
In the EU most quotas under current access re-
sult from old preferential agreements, and many of
them are allowed on a preferential basis. Out of 44
current access TRQs, 17 are allocated to a particu-
lar list of countries. This includes some non-WTO
member countries, such as the People’s Republic
of China. Several quotas are preallocated to Cen-
tral and Eastern European Courttries (CEECS) as-
sociated with the European Union, Some quotas
are also allocated to ACP countries which benefit
from a preferential agreement. This is the case par-
ticularly with quotas for sheep, goats, mushrooms,
of a 1.2 million ton quota for sugar, and a granted
share of the quota for bananas. Access to some
tariff rate quotas is restricted to the U.S., Australia,
Uruguay, New Zealand, Chile, Indonesia, Thai-
land, India, Iceland, and Greenland. In some cases,
the entire quota is preallocated to a particular coun-
try (New-zealand in tie case of EU imports of
butter).
In the EU, quotas under minimum access are
administered on a MFN basis and are therefore not
allocated to a particular country. However, quotas
on rice can be considered an exception, because the
administrative conditions for the allocation of li-
censes discriminate between countries. In the case
of rice, the administrative procedures (export li-
censes) result in allocating imports to Thailand and
Australia. As part of the concessions made to the
United States as compensation for the accession of
Finland, Austria, and Sweden to the EU, the EU
agreed to implement tariff rate quotas (TRQ) for
imports from the U.S. of 38,700 tons of milled rice
with zero duty and 7,600 tons of brown rice (The
new 100,000 ton quota for malting barley with a
50% tariff reduction, which is not part of the EU
schedule, is also allocated to the U.S.).
A controversy exists regarding the actual allo-
cation on a MFN basis of some other EU minimum
access quotas. The EU Schedule states that for 18
out of the 35 quotas under minimum access, the
EU may count against quota the preferential im-
ports from CEECS under the so-called Europe
Agreement (concluded with countries that are ex-
pected to join the EU in the near future). This is the
case for pork (5 quotas), poultry (3 quotas), dairy76 April 2000 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 3. Number of TRQs Administered According to a Particular Procedure (1997)
LoD
Mixed or
His FCFS ST PG AU AT non specified Total
EU 44 20 21 — — 2 87
Canada 5 6 7 l—— 2 21
Korea 4— 21 10 4 5 2 21 67
Israel 2 1 1 — — 2 6 12
Japan — 12 — 4 1 3 20




Thailand 10 3 2— 5 1 2 1
USA 1
23
27 — — 26 54
LoD: Licenses on demand, on the basis of quantity requested, uniform reduction if the sum of requests exceeds TRQ; His: allocated
to historical importers; FCFS: Fkst-come-first served; ST: Licenses allocated to state owned importer; PG: Licenses allocated to
producers’ organization; AU: Auction; AT: Applied tariff (unlimited imports, TRQ notified but not enforced); Mixed: includes
lottery in the USA.
products (7 quotas), and processed eggs (3 quotas).
The EU Schedule does not specify the quantities
under quota that would be allocated or the eligible
countries. The EU is suspected to grant lower tar-
iffs to CEECS than the regular in-quota tariffs, The
U.S. Department of Agriculture claims that this
allows the CEECS to capture a disproportionate
share of the minimum access TRQs, and reap most
of the benefits of improved market access, espe-
cially for pork, poultry and, to a lesser extent, skim
milk powder (USDA 1997). The EU claims the
opposite, and that the corresponding MFN in-quota
tariffs were reduced to the same level as those
under the Europe Agreement, The issue was raised
officially by the U.S. during the November 1998
meeting of the Committee of Agriculture. The EU
responded that imports under European agree-
ments are counted in the tariff quotas only when
the tariff under the preferential agreement was
identical to the in-quota tariff and that there was no
other case in which preferential imports had been
counted against the quota (national statistics on
applied tariffs in Germany show that the in-quota
tariffs on live animal imports from third countries
were lowered to the level charged on imports from
the Central European countries, supporting the EU
Commission’s claim).
Management of Import Licenses
Allocation Method
In the EU, the management of tariff quotas, with
the exception of the quota for rice and cassava, has
not raised many controversies. Tariff quotas are
allocated using mainly three methods: allocation as
a proportion of licenses requested; allocation to
traditional importers; and the first-come, first-
served procedure, depending on the quota. Though
these procedures are not at all ideal from the point
of view of economic theory, most economists find
that they do at least not discriminate explicitly
among exporting countries (see Podbury and Rob-
erts 1999; OECD 1999). Table 3 shows EU man-
agement procedures in comparison with those used
by other developed countries. The pros and cons of
each particular method are described in detail in
OECD (1999).
The three methods of tariff quota allocation are
described below:
9 Licenses as a function of quantities reauested.
l
With this me~hod, licen~e~ are grante~ on de-
mand, until they exceed available quantities.
The allocation of licenses can be the respon-
sibility of the EU Commission, as it is the case
for fruits (cherries, apricots, oranges, lemons)
or of member states of the EU. National gov-
ernments indicate to the Commission the num-
ber of requests and the quantities requested. If
the sum of the import licenses exceeds the
level of TRQ, the Commission reduces pro-
portionally the level of each license. Under
this system, conditions for entry are known,
which provides a degree of certainty to im-
porters regarding the precise tariffs and entry
requirements. This procedure is not used for
all TRQs because, according to the EU, it
would result in excessively low quantities at-
tributed to individual importers when demand
is much larger than available quantities.
Allocation to traditional importers. For some
quotas, as under current access, import li-
censes are given to traditional importers. This
has the advantage of maintaining established
contacts and preventing speculators from win-
ning control of licenses, but may result in ri-Bureau and Tangertnann Tariff Rate Quolas in the EU 77
gidities in the market. In order to open access
to the market to newcomers, a share of the
quota is reserved to new importers in the EU.
For live cattle, for example, 20$70of the quota
is allocated to newcomers, the rest to tradi-
tional importers. This provision also exists for
the quotas of beef, bananas, mushrooms,
wheat, skim milk powder, and butter.
l First come-first served. For four quotas (of-
fals, life sheep and potatoes) no rule exists for
allocating licenses in the EU. Instead, licenses
are granted to the importer by order of request,
even though these quotas are allocated to a
predetermined list of countries. The advantage
of this method is that it reduces the odds of
creating vested interests, compared with a li-
censing system, However, it may encourage
concentration and seasonality of imports.
No quotas are allocated through state monopoly
and producers’ organizations. Two quotas are man-
aged by a mixed procedure by WTO standards, In
these cases, the share of the quota which is pre-
allocated to a given list of countries, is managed on
a first-come, first-served basis, while the other
share of quota (i.e., MFN) is managed on the basis
of import licenses.
Administrative Restrictions
Management of quotas sometimes involves addi-
tional requirements from importers (and some-
times exporters) in order to allocate licenses. For
example, to import live cattle, beef, corn, rice, or
wheat, importers must be registered in the Value
Added Tax system of one member state. In a few
cases (some beef offals), imports are allowed only
for processing. Grape juice can be imported only if
it goes for products other than wine, Importers of
raw cane sugar must process it before the first of
July and must themselves be refiners. In some
cases, authorities of the exporting country must
provide a certificate of authenticity of the product.
In the case of cane sugar, a certificate of origin is
required. Finally, would-be importers of rice, corn,
millet, durum, or oats must show that they have
traded this commodity within the previous twelve
months; for eggs, applicants must have imported at
least 50 tons of egg products during each of the
previous two years (similar conditions exist for tur-
key meat). In the cases of cassava and rice, export
licenses are required from some countries (Indo-
nesia, in the case of cassava; Thailand and Austra-
lia in the case of rice).
Validity of Licenses
For 59 out of the 87 tariff quotas, import licenses
have a limited validity. Such a restriction also ex-
ists in many countries, including Canada, In the
EU, imports must take place within a few months,
but license validity is shorter in some cases. This
restriction could raise problems for imports from
remote countries. For example import licenses for
wheat and durttm are valid for seven days, sugar
for thirty days, representing potential administra-
tive obstacles to imports. Such provisions have
been questioned within the WTO Committee for
Agriculture. The EU claims that the system is de-
signed to avoid excess subscription to tariff quotas;
that, even for wheat, importers have in fact a 45-
day delay between the subscription to an import
license and its expiration; and that the tariff rate
quotas in question have been fully utilized (June
1997 meeting).
Fill Rates
The fill rate expresses actual imports as a percent-
age of the TRQ volume concerned. Fill rates can be
seen as an ex-post check of the way countries have
implemented the market access commitments of
the URAA. However, the fill rate is an ambiguous
indicator, since a low fill rate can be explained by
market forces. One should keep in mind that if
domestic products are competitive, if the in-quota
tariff is prohibitive, or if there is no demand for the
product, the fill rate may be low in spite of the
absence of restrictive quota management practices
(Boughner and de Gorter 1998).
Current Access Quotas
The fill rate of quotas under current access is, on
average, 73’%0in the EU (table 4). Averages are,
however, of little meaning, because of the presence
of very small quotas in the list. It is necessary to
focus on the large quotas in order to have a better
Table 4. Fill Rates of TRQs, 1995-97
Average (Minimum and Current Access)
Rate Rate Rate Average
1995 1996 1997 1995–97
EU 75% 71% 73% 73%
WTO Membersi 65% 63% 46% 58%
Canada 78% 85% 83% 82%
Japan 70% 71% 70% 70?70
USA 48% 53% 56% 52%
Korea 78% 76% 76% 77%
(i): countries notifying TRQs.78 April 2000 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
image of the fill rate. Sixteen of the EU’s 44 quotas
under current access had a fill rate lower than 85%
in 1997. TRQs for live animals were close to being
fully utilized: The main quota (169,000 heads of
live young cattle for fattening) was filled at 100%.
Current access quotas for beef (roughly 140,000
tons) are almost entirely filled, even though im-
ports from the United States were temporarily sus-
pended in 1999 because of the finding of hormone
residues. The large quota of sheep meat (283,000
tons) was filled up to 88% in 1997, but the quota
for live sheep and goats filled only to 64%.
The main quota for dairy products is 72,000 tons
of butter allocated to New Zealand. The EU argued
that there was a problem of product definition (the
quarrel between New Zealand and the EU on the
treatment of spreadable butter has now been
settled, but the WTO has yet to be notified of the
fill rate). Quotas for cheddar and cheese for pro-
cessing allocated to New Zealand and Australia
have been almost entirely filled.
Lower fill rates are those observed for feed-
stuffs. The 5.5 million ton-quota for cassava, allo-
cated to Thailand, and the 600,000 tons of sweet
potatoes allocated to China show low fill rates. So
do the 135,000 tons of arrow root and manioc
TRQ, allocated to China and other non WTO coun-
tries, and the 135,000 ton quota for bran, The main
reason for these low fill rates, according to the EU,
is several years of common agricultural policy re-
forms: significant cuts of EU support prices for
cereals under the MacSharry reform have made
imports of feedstuffs, that in the past were used as
cereal substitutes, less in demand. This is reflected
in the large shift in consumption from imported
grains substitutes such as corn gluten feed to do-
mestic grains in the EU over the last few years, in
spite of the low tariffs for grain substitutes. In ad-
dition, the main suppliers of cassava are them-
selves becoming larger users, or find increasing
demand in neighboring countries. This is also the
case in China, where domestic demand absorbs the
supply of sweet potatoes and arrowroot. The large
quotas for maize (3 million tons) and sorghum
(300,000 tons) were only utilized at 70% in 1997,
in spite of a variable tariff that was supposed to be
adjusted so as to ensure that the quota would be
filled (note that imports of sorghum far exceeded
the quota in 1996). The quotas that correspond to
non-tarified products are in general very small,
with the exception of almonds (90,000 tons),
which is fully utilized,
There appears to be no obvious relationship be-
tween the rate by which the within-quota tariff is
reduced relative to the over-quota tariff and quota
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Figure 1. Quota Fill and Tariff Reduction for
50 TRQs under Current Access in the EU
Minimum Access Quotas
The fill rate of quotas under minimum access in the
EU is 7470. Again, an arithmetic average must be
interpreted with caution, given the considerable
heterogeneity of the different quotas. The quota for
rum and taffia, for example, has a very low fill rate,
in particular because the last available figures refer
to 1997, when the quota had just begun to be
implemented. Overall, fourteen of them have a fill
rate lower than 8570.
The three quotas (roughly 20,000 tons) of high
quality beef are fully utilized. So are the quotas of
poultry cuts (30,000 tons). The quota for skim milk
powder (40,000 tons) are the various quotas mak-
ing up a total of 15,000 tons of cheese are also fully
utilized. The different quotas for pork are among
the most underutilized. The reason, according to
the EU, is low demand from the industry for im-
ports, especially in processed products (sausages)
because of the competitive EU’S production. One
indication of this is that most of pork exports (65 ?io
in 1997) are shipped without subsidies. The quota
for eggs for consumption shows a fill rate as little
as 1%. Again, the EU explains this situation by
market conditions, and points out the 100% utili-
zation of the quota for egg yolks and eggs not in
shell. The egg albumin quota is only filled up to
46910.
Minimum access quotas for grains includes a
500,000-ton quota for maize, a quota for husked
rice (20,000 tons) and for milled rice (63,000 tons)
and a quota for quality wheat (300,000 tons) which
are completely utilized in 1998, Note that, in some
cases, fill rates are below 1OO’-% with actual imports
having been above TRQ volumes. An explanation
is that the administrative procedure for accessing
imports under quotas is complicated and involves
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Figure 2. Quota Fill and Tariff Reduction for
37 TRQs under Minimum Access in the EU
ence between the in-quota and out-of-quota tariff is
limited, importers choose a simpler administrative
procedure over a lower tariff.
In the case of the EU’s minimum access quotas,
the relationship between the rate of tariff reduction
and quota fill, as shown in figure 2, suggests the
tendency that the lower the in-quota tariff is rela-
tive to the above-quota tariff, the higher the quota
fill.
Conclusion
The EU, like many other WTO member countries,
opened a large number (87) of TRQs after the Uru-
guay Round, following the agreement laid down in
the Modalities that minimum access should be pro-
vided and that current access (i.e., access that ex-
isted before the Uruguay Round) not be restricted.
Unlike those of nearly all other countries, quotas in
the EU’s Schedule are clearly categorized as mini-
mum access or current access TRQs, providing
transparency in this regard. Roughly two fifths of
the EU’S TRQs come under current access, usually
providing continued access, on a bilateral basis, for
exporters who in the past enjoyed preferential ac-
cess to the EU or who had low or zero tariff access
to EU markets for the products concerned under
voluntary restraint agreements. As far as quantities
are concerned, the EU’s current access quotas tend
to be much larger than those opened under mini-
mum access.
In establishing the TRQs, it appears that the EU
has not deviated from fundamental rules in the Mo-
dalities. As in many other countries, there was a bit
of “dirty quotification” in the EU, both in terms of
product specification and the calculation of mini-
mum access quantities based on domestic con-
sumption.
In the EU, the relationship between within-quota
tariffs and above-quota tariffs differs greatly be-
tween current and minimum access. Under current
access, in-quota tariffs as percentages of above-
quota tariffs vary widely across products, because
the individual TRQs reflect their historical origins
and, hence, the (usually) low levels of protection
that the EU had historically agreed on with the
exporting countries concerned. For most minimum
access TRQs, on the other hand, the EU has set
in-quota tariffs at a universal percentage (3270) of
out-of-quota tariffs, and has not distinguished be-
tween less and more sensitive products, For both
current and minimum access quotas, within-quota
tariffs remained constant during the URAA imple-
mentation period, so that over time they have risen
relative to the declining over-quota tariffs.
In administering license allocation under the
TRQs, the EU has not been particularly inventive,
neither in using approaches that make it difficult to
import the products concerned or in coming up
with innovative approaches or methods, such as
auctioning, that are economically more convincing
than the other, more frequently used, approaches.
Fill rates of TRQs in the EU have been reason-
ably high and have increased over time. It is inter-
esting to note that some of the larger current-access
quotas have exhibited relatively low fill rates, more
so than have minimum access quotas. This was
particularly the case with current access quotas for
feedstuffs that in the past were used as cereal sub-
stitutes in the EU. With the significant cut in EU
cereal support prices, it cannot come as a surprise
that import demand for these feedstuffs has de-
clined noticeably. As far as we can see, no case has
been identified in which the EU has deliberately
used quota management procedures to make access
to its markets more cumbersome than it will al-
ways be under a TRQ regime.
Overall, it appears that the EU has played a rea-
sonably fair game as far as TRQs are concerned.
Concerns do remain, though, as to the exact articu-
lation of the Europe Agreement and the quotas
under minimum access. The EU has indicated in its
schedule that imports under the (preferential) Eu-
rope Agreement could be counted against certain
quotas. Even though this provision is used when
preferential tariffs under the Europe Agreement
and in-quota (MFN) tariffs are similar, other coun-
tries fear that this could result in CEECS taking
greater advantage of the EU increase in market
access under the minimum access provisions.
It is still difficult to make an assessment of the
actual increase in access to the EU market that has
resulted from the URAA. The scheduled decrease
in tariff is still being implemented, some statistics80 April 2000 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
have yet to be published, and because of short run
fluctuations of world prices, one needs a few more
years for assessing changes in imports flows. How-
ever, it is very likely that most of the increase in
access to the EU market has resulted from the set-
ting of minimum access TRQs. The 36% cut in
bound tariff has mainly resulted in squeezing out
the original water in tariffs that resulted from the
so-called dirty tariffication process (see IATRC
1997). Future cuts in bound tariffs are likely to
have a significant impact on trade flows but, so far,
it is the TRQ system that has resulted in the most
significant increase in EU imports. One explana-
tion is that, while tariff cuts have been imple-
mented progressively, the EU has set TRQs so that
market access represents 570 of consumption sev-
eral years before the end of the implementation
period of the URAA. Even though several TRQs
were only partially filled during the first years,
they now lead to significant increases in imports in
the cheese, grain and beef sectors (for example, the
300,000 tonne quota for quality wheat showed only
a 30% fill rate in 1997 but this quota was entirely
filled in 1998).
For the next round of WTO negotiations, an in-
teresting question is which approach might work
best to liberalize trade under the EU’S TRQs: re-
ductions of in-quota tariffs or an expansion of
quota volumes. Clearly, this differs from product
to product. However, as a general rough rule it
would appear that an expansion of quota volumes
is likely to achieve more than a reduction of in-
quota tariffs. In most cases where fill rates are low
in the EU this appears to be the case not because
in-quota tariffs are high but because import de-
mand is limited on EU markets, probably even at
lower tariffs. As a matter of fact, in several cases
low fill rates coincide with low or even zero in-
quota tariffs (e.g. worked oats, with zero in-quota
tariff but a fill rate of only 2290 in 1997). In such
cases, neither large quota volumes nor lower in-
quota tariffs would make imports grow. Contrari-
wise, where TRQs are fully used, only an expan-
sion of quota volumes can help to liberalize trade,
while a reduction of in-quota tariffs would do no
more than to raise rents which anyhow tend to flow
to EU-based traders. Hence, for the EU’s negoti-
ating partners it may be best, in the next WTO
round, to concentrate on an expansion of TRQ vol-
umes.
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